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Closing Pandora’s Box: Proposing a Statutory 
Solution to the Supreme Court’s Failure to 
Adequately Protect Private Property 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is by no means an exaggeration to characterize the Supreme 
Court’s 2005 Kelo v. City of New London decision as its most 
unpopular ruling in more than a century. Justice Scalia, one of four 
Kelo dissenters, went so far as to put Kelo in the company of Dred 
Scott and Roe v. Wade—decisions he claimed represented the Court’s 
most severe lapses in judgment.1 In Kelo, the Supreme Court upheld 
a municipal redevelopment plan that resulted in the forced transfer 
of nine residents’ homes to a private development corporation. The 
Court held that the increased tax revenue and other secondary 
benefits to the city constituted a “public use” under the Fifth 
Amendment, justifying the condemnation and forced transfer of the 
residents’ homes.2 However, it noted that “nothing in our opinion 
precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of 
takings power.”3 
The subsequent response from state legislatures was 
unprecedented. In direct response to Kelo, forty-three states enacted 
legislation curbing the use of eminent domain for economic 
redevelopment.4 On November 8, 2011, Mississippi became the 
forty-fourth, passing a referendum by an overwhelming seventy-
three to twenty-seven percent majority that placed restrictions on the 
transfer of condemned property to private parties.5 On the federal 
level, politicians as ideologically diverse as Rep. Maxine Waters (D-
 
 1. Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Lumps Kelo Decision with Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade, 
ABAJOURNAL.COM (Oct. 19, 2011, 8:05 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/scalia_ lumps_kelo_decision_with_dred_scott_and_roe_v._wade.  
 2. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005); see infra Part II.C. 
 3. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489. 
 4. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2100, 2101–02 (2009). 
 5. Ilya Somin, Referendum Initiatives Prevent Eminent Domain Abuse, THE DAILY 
CALLER (Nov. 11, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/09/referendum-
initiatives-prevent-emine nt-domain-abuse. 
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CA) on the left and Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) on the right 
sponsored bills aimed at enacting similar reforms on a national level.6 
While property-rights advocates generally find this barrage of 
legislation encouraging, there is some concern that many states’ 
efforts are merely cosmetic. That is, although the statutes purport to 
limit the type of taking at issue in Kelo, they are riddled with 
exceptions that eviscerate any substantive protections against forced 
transfers to private developers. Other scholars argue that many states 
have gone too far, limiting municipalities’ ability to deal with blight 
and urban sprawl.7 This Comment surveys enacted state legislation 
and proposed federal legislation to evaluate the validity of these 
claims. Ultimately, it finds the vast majority of these efforts wanting 
and proposes the creation of a federal cause of action modeled 
loosely on shareholder derivative suits. Unlike proposed federal 
legislation and many state statutes, this approach avoids burdening 
federal and local law enforcement, makes economic-development 
takings infeasible in most instances, and also allows states the 
flexibility they need to deal with actual blight. 
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part II demonstrates the 
need for a statutory approach to takings reform by showing that Kelo 
was simply a logical extension of the preceding 100 years of Supreme 
Court precedent. Part III discusses the leading arguments for and 
against the use of eminent domain for economic development, 
providing context for Part IV’s survey of the many legislative 
responses to Kelo. Part V proposes creating a federal cause of action 
for property owners involved in improper takings and concludes. 
II. WHY A STATUTORY SOLUTION? A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT’S TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
Despite the unprecedented outrage to Kelo among politicians, 
commentators, and the general public,8 the majority’s reasoning was 
largely consistent with more than 100 years of the Supreme Court’s 
public-use jurisprudence. This Part traces the genesis of the ultimate 
result in Kelo back to the Court’s first public-use holdings in the 
latter nineteenth century. Broadly, two lines of cases emerged, with 
 
 6. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra Part III.A. 
 8. See Somin, supra note 4, at 2108–14 (cataloguing the disapproval displayed by 
politicians, commentators, and the general public that cut across traditional partisan lines). 
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some overlap. The first defined public use as “public power”—a 
seizure of private property constituted a public use so long as it 
furthered the government’s exercise of a constitutional power. The 
second defined public use as any action that tended to produce a 
“public benefit” or carried out a “public purpose.” Early on, the 
Court afforded state governments substantial deference in 
categorizing their legislative goals as “public purposes.” In the 
twentieth century, the Court began to explicitly rely on both 
definitions, granting state legislatures virtually unlimited 
condemnation authority while leaving little room for future courts to 
impose limitations. 
A. Public Use Defined by the Scope of the Government’s Constitutional 
Powers 
For at least the past century, the Court has defined public use by 
reference to the scope of the government’s constitutional authority, 
giving substantial deference to legislative determinations that a 
particular action constitutes a public use.9 In United States v. 
Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., for example, the Court upheld the 
federal government’s efforts to condemn the Gettysburg battlefield 
under a statute authorizing the construction of public buildings.10 
The condemnation upset Gettysburg Electric’s plans to build a 
railroad on its own property, and the asserted purpose of the taking 
was historical preservation, not erecting public facilities.11 The Court 
held that any exercise of eminent domain constitutes a public use if 
the condemnation is “necessary or appropriate” to the exercise of 
any constitutionally authorized power.12 Moreover, legislative 
judgments about what qualifies as a public use under the 
Constitution are entitled to deference unless their rationale is 
“palpably without reasonable foundation.”13 
Nine years later, the Court extended the reasoning from 
Gettysburg Electric to takings of a distinctly private character. In 
 
 9. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Old Dominion Land Co. v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); Strickley v. Highland Bay Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 
527, 530–31 (1906); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905); United States v. Gettysburg 
Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 679 (1896). 
 10. Gettysburg Electric, 160 U.S. at 681–82. 
 11. Id. at 680–81. 
 12. Id. at 679. 
 13. Id. at 680. 
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Clark v. Nash, the Court upheld a Utah statute that authorized a 
private party to condemn a portion of his neighbor’s land to access 
irrigation water.14 Despite the private nature of the taking, the Court 
deferred to the Utah Legislature’s determination that such a use was 
indeed “public” under the Constitution.15 Notwithstanding the 
Court’s efforts to limit its holding so as not to “approv[e] of the 
broad proposition that private property may be taken in all cases 
where the taking may . . . tend to develop [a state’s] natural 
resources,”16 just one year later it approved a mining company’s 
efforts to condemn private property for construction of aerial 
transport-bucket lines.17 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Holmes noted that the mine’s efforts to ease delivery of its ore to 
railways “should not be made impossible by the refusal of a private 
owner to sell the right to cross his land.”18 The state legislature’s 
determination that such condemnations constituted a public use was 
enough to satisfy the Constitution’s public-use requirement.19 
The Court reaffirmed the strength of this proposition in Old 
Dominion Land Co. v. United States and in Berman v. Parker. In Old 
Dominion, Congress condemned a lessor’s land after the owner 
refused the government’s offer to buy the property.20 The owner 
challenged the taking, asserting that the government’s purpose of 
preserving structures it had built during its lease was not a public 
purpose.21 The Court upheld the condemnation, holding that 
Congress’s declaration that its purpose was indeed a public one 
created a rebuttable presumption that the taking did not violate the 
public-use clause.22 The Court noted that such legislative 
determinations are entitled to deference unless shown to “involve an 
impossibility.”23 Similarly, in Berman v. Parker, the Court upheld a 
redevelopment project in Washington, D.C., that resulted in the 
 
 14. Clark, 198 U.S. at 370. 
 15. Id. at 369–70. 
 16. Id. at 369. 
 17. Strickley v. Highland Bay Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531–32 (1906). 
 18. Id. at 531. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 63 (1925). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 66. 
 23. Id. 
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condemnation of a department store.24 Even though the 
redevelopment scheme ultimately transferred the condemned 
property to another private party for redevelopment, the Court held 
that the taking was for public use.25 It reasoned that because 
Congress had the authority to alleviate blight conditions in the 
District of Columbia, it also had the authority to employ private 
owners to carry out its legislatively determined public purpose.26 The 
Court stated that “the means of executing the project are for 
Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose 
has been established.”27 
B. Public Use Defined as “Public Benefit” or “Public Purpose” Not 
Ownership or Access 
Although state courts have occasionally defined “public use” as 
requiring some degree of public ownership or access,28 the Supreme 
Court has never adopted such an interpretation. Beginning at least as 
far back as the late nineteenth century, a second line of Supreme 
Court precedent adopted a broad definition of public use that 
authorizes any taking that produces a public benefit or achieves a 
public purpose.29 In Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, the 
Court upheld a private taking exercised under a California law that 
created cooperative-irrigation districts.30 The law required any 
member of a district to pay fees that funded the groups’ collective 
efforts to irrigate their land.31 The District condemned and sold the 
property of one member who had refused to pay her fee.32 In 
upholding the taking and the law that authorized it, the Court noted 
that “[i]t is not essential that the entire community, or even any 
 
 24. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954). 
 25. Id. at 33–34. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 33. 
 28. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An 
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 507–
08 (2006). 
 29. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Rindge Co. v. Los 
Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. 
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896). 
 30. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 119–22, 160–61. 
 31. Id. at 116 n.1.  
 32. Id. at 122. 
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considerable portion thereof, should directly enjoy or participate in 
an improvement in order to constitute a public use.”33 The “public 
purpose” of facilitating the cultivation of millions of acres of arid 
property constituted a public use that satisfied the Constitution.34 In 
Clark v. Nash, the Court employed a similar definition of public use, 
upholding a Utah statute that allowed a property owner to condemn 
his neighbor’s land to access irrigation water.35 In defining public 
use, the Court noted that the “results upon the growth and 
prosperity of the state . . . have a material bearing upon the question 
whether the individual use proposed might in fact be a public one.”36 
The “public benefits” and “public purposes” that justify a taking 
do not necessarily have to be economic in nature, nor must they be 
generally available for public enjoyment.37 In Rindge Co. v. Los 
Angeles, the Court upheld the condemnation of land traversing a 
private ranch for the construction of two highways, both of which 
would dead-end within the ranch property without connecting to 
any other road.38 The Court held that the taking was for public use 
even though the road merely provided a scenic coastal view before 
terminating inside the county line.39 It noted that “[p]ublic uses are 
not limited . . . to matters of mere business necessity and ordinary 
convenience, but may extend to matters of public health, recreation 
and enjoyment.”40  
Similarly, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court upheld a 
taking for which the direct benefits would accrue almost exclusively 
to a private party.41 At issue was a federal regulation that authorized 
the EPA to use data submitted by pesticide-registration applicants 
when evaluating other applicants42 and also disclose some data 
publicly to simplify the application process.43 Monsanto challenged 
 
 33. Id. at 161–62. 
 34. Id. at 161. 
 35. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905). 
 36. Id. at 398. 
 37. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Rindge Co. v. Los 
Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923). 
 38. Rindge, 262 U.S. at 703, 710. 
 39. Id. at 707–08. 
 40. Id. at 707. 
 41. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014. 
 42. Id. at 990. 
 43. Id. 
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the public disclosure of data it believed to be intellectual property, 
alleging that the disclosure in effect “took” its private property to 
benefit other private competitors.44  Despite the Court’s recognition 
that “the most direct beneficiaries of EPA actions . . .will be later 
applicants who will support their applications by citation to data 
submitted by Monsanto,” it held that the taking was for public use.45 
It noted that the taking need only have a “conceivable public 
character,”46 and that fostering competition in the pesticide market 
by removing barriers to entry was “well within the police power of 
Congress.”47 
C. Midkiff and Kelo: The Public-Purpose and  
Public-Power Doctrines Merge 
By themselves, neither of the public-use definitions discussed 
above provides strong limitations on the government’s eminent-
domain powers. Taken together, the government’s condemnation 
authority would be virtually limitless, and after the Court’s rulings in 
Midkiff and Kelo, that is more or less the case. Today, a “public use” 
under the Fifth Amendment is defined by the scope of a sovereign’s 
constitutional power,48 and legislatures receive substantial deference 
in determining what public needs justify the use of eminent 
domain.49 Stated differently, a legislature can use eminent domain to 
pursue any public purpose within the scope of its authority, and it 
enjoys wide latitude from the court to determine the public purposes 
it constitutionally may pursue—a classic case of trusting the fox to 
guard the henhouse. 
While the Court had articulated the public-purpose and public- 
power definitions of public use in prior cases, the Court did not 
explicitly rely on both of them in a single case until the middle of the 
twentieth century.50 Two of the Court’s most recent takings 
 
 44. Id. at 998–99. 
 45. Id. at 1014–15. 
 46. Id. at 1014. 
 47. Id. at 1015. 
 48. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984). 
 49. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005). 
 50. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–36 (1954) (holding that Congress 
could condemn non-blighted property as part of a plan to redevelop a blighted area because it 
had the constitutional authority to eliminate blight, and its legislative determination that the 
non-blighted condemnation was necessary to exercise its power in such a manner was entitled 
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decisions illustrate how difficult it is to place any principled limits on 
the power of eminent domain in light of these two definitions. 
In Midkiff, the Court upheld a Hawaiian land redistribution 
statute that allowed the state to condemn private property and 
immediately sell the land to the previous owner’s lessees.51 The act’s 
goal was to ameliorate what the legislature determined to be an 
inequitable distribution of land; seventy-two private landowners 
owned fee title to forty-seven percent of the land in Hawaii, while 
the government owned forty-nine percent.52 Even though the act 
essentially resulted in the transfer of property from one private party 
to another, the Court held that the redistribution efforts of the 
Hawaii legislature constituted a public use.53 Citing Berman, it noted 
that the “‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the 
scope of a sovereign’s police power[].”54 Because a state’s police 
power encompasses the authority to regulate oligopolies, and the 
legislature believed the land-reform act would remove artificial 
distortions in its real-estate market that were injurious to the public, 
the act posed no constitutional difficulties.55 
Notice that in the absence of either the public-power or public- 
purpose definition of public use, the Court would have had room to 
invalidate the statute. If public use were only defined in reference to 
Hawaii’s police power, the Court could have held that Hawaii 
indeed had the authority to regulate oligopolies through use of 
eminent domain, but determined that the scheme was ultimately a 
taking for “private use” because the statute simply transferred 
property from one private party to another. The Court would not 
have had to defer to the Hawaii legislature’s determination that the 
coerced transfers legitimately served a public purpose. Similarly, if 
public use was simply defined by the legislature’s conception of a 
public purpose, the Court could have deferred to the legislature’s 
determination that correcting real-estate market inequities is a public 
purpose, but invalidated the statute because the Constitution 
prohibits states from using their regulatory powers to transfer 
 
to deference). 
 51. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233–34, 241–42. 
 52. Id. at 232. 
 53. Id. at 241–42. 
 54. Id. at 240. 
 55. Id. at 242. 
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property from one private party to another. However, if courts must 
defer to legislative judgments to determine what constitutes a 
legitimate public purpose, and at the same time recognize eminent 
domain as a power instrumental to the government’s exercise of any 
other constitutional power, there is no principled way to limit 
condemnation authority. 
The Court’s ruling in Kelo v. City of New London supports this 
proposition. In Kelo, the Court sustained a municipal redevelopment 
project that condemned non-blighted residential property to make 
way for commercial retail space and new housing developments.56 
The city’s plans came on the heels of an announcement from a large 
pharmaceutical company that planned to build a research facility in 
the area. The city hoped the resulting economic activity would end 
years of population decline and high unemployment.57 Despite the 
fact that the condemned properties would be leased to private parties 
for redevelopment, the Court held that the condemnations were for 
public use.58 It noted that “for more than a century, our public-use 
jurisprudence has . . . afford[ed] legislatures broad latitude in 
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings 
power,”59 and deferred to New London’s determination that the 
condemned properties were “sufficiently distressed to justify a 
program of economic rejuvenation.”60 The substantial deference 
afforded legislatures was underscored by the Court’s explicit 
rejection of any requirement that the public benefits of such a 
project be reasonably certain to accrue.61 Finally, the Court pointed 
out that New London had authority to use eminent domain to 
promote economic development by virtue of a Connecticut statute 
that authorized municipalities to take such action.62 
Just as the holding in Midkiff relied on the public-power and 
public- purpose definitions of public use to uphold Hawaii’s land-
reform act, the Kelo majority’s rationale necessarily relied on both 
principles to uphold New London’s economic-development plan. If 
the Court did not view eminent domain as a mere tool at the 
 
 56. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475, 484 (2005). 
 57. Id. at 473–75. 
 58. Id. at 483. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 487–88. 
 62. Id. at 483–84. 
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government’s disposal in its exercise of any other constitutional 
power, the Kelo Court could have deferred to New London’s 
definition of economic rejuvenation as a public purpose, but then 
ultimately concluded that no constitutional power permits the use of 
eminent domain to reach such an end. Likewise, without deferring 
to New London’s definition of public purpose, the Court could have 
conceded that states and municipalities have the constitutional power 
to promote economic development generally, but invalidated the 
plan because, in this instance, New London was employing its 
condemnation authority for a distinctly private purpose. 
For these very reasons, the Kelo dissenters struggled to identify 
any principle in the Court’s jurisprudence that compelled a different 
result. Justice O’Connor, who ironically authored the Court’s 
unanimous opinion in Midkiff, argued that economic-development 
takings were only permissible to alleviate affirmative harm to society 
that emanates from a property’s pre-condemnation use.63 In 
Berman, however, the Court allowed the condemnation of a 
department store near a blighted area that, by the Court’s own 
admission, was not itself blighted.64 Moreover, Justice O’Connor’s 
public-harm test ignores states’ historical police power to abate 
nuisances without paying property owners a cent of compensation.65 
Justice Thomas’s dissent is perhaps most telling. After surveying the 
Court’s takings jurisprudence from Fallbrook to Midkiff, he 
concluded that the Court should “revisit [its] Public Use Clause 
cases and consider returning to the original meaning of the Public 
Use Clause.”66 In essence, Justice Thomas saw no way around the 
majority holding aside from overturning one hundred years of the 
Court’s takings jurisprudence. 
III. PRIVATE–PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS, OR CRONY CAPITALISM? 
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT 
TAKINGS 
Defending the ultimate result in Kelo is a lonely endeavor. From 
Richard Epstein and Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) on the right, to the 
 
 63. Id. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 64. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34–36 (1954). 
 65. Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 151, 
168 (2009). 
 66. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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NAACP and Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) on the left, pundits and 
politicians across the political spectrum have attacked Kelo’s 
reasoning and attempted to legislate away its effects.67 However, 
critics eager to eliminate economic-development takings altogether 
should take care to consider the consequences of such a measure 
before proceeding haphazardly. To that end, this Part briefly surveys 
the theoretical and practical considerations that justify the use of 
eminent domain for economic development. It also discusses the 
leading arguments for limiting the government’s condemnation 
authority in this arena. This discussion is not intended to be 
exhaustive, but it provides context for the policy critiques and 
proposals that follow in Parts IV and V. 
A. Rationale Supporting Economic-Development Takings 
For a variety of reasons, economists and jurists have long 
supported the use of eminent domain for urban renewal and 
economic development. Economists typically focus on the difficulty 
of assembling contiguous property for large-scale development 
projects. Because one stubborn property owner can scuttle a socially 
valuable investment, they argue, the visible hand of government is 
necessary to correct the market’s failure in such instances. Other 
scholars point out the significant costs associated with urban sprawl, 
contending that eminent domain is one of the few viable solutions 
available to urban planners. Finally, recent scholarship suggests that 
trimming the government’s eminent-domain authority may 
paradoxically provide less protection for private-property owners. 
1. The holdout problem: Eminent domain corrects market inefficiencies 
The “holdout problem” is perhaps the principal justification for 
allowing municipalities to exercise their condemnation authority for 
redevelopment projects. Highways, railroads, shopping centers, and 
 
 67. Richard Epstein and the NAACP both submitted amicus briefs supporting the Kelo 
petitioners. Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108) (Epstein wrote the brief for the Cato Institute); Brief of Amici 
Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108). 
Rep. Waters (D-CA) and Sen. Cornyn (R-TX) both introduced bills to limit states’ use of 
eminent domain for economic development. H.R. 3315, 109th Cong. (2005) (Rep. Waters’s 
bill); S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005) (Sen. Cornyn’s bill). For a discussion of the broad 
opposition to Kelo on both the right and the left, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1418 (2006). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1342 
other large-scale projects require developers to assemble contiguous 
parcels of land. In some instances, one property owner’s refusal to 
sell can lead to delays, increased costs, or the potential failure of a 
project.68 The holdout problem arises when owners in such a 
position demand a price much higher than the amount that would 
persuade them to sell their property under ordinary circumstances. If 
owners’ demands raise the costs of the project prohibitively, the 
developer may pull the plug, and society forgoes a transaction that 
could have left everyone involved better off. A brief numerical 
example demonstrates the nature of the problem and why eminent 
domain represents an economically efficient69 solution. 
Suppose a developer needs one hundred parcels for a project 
with a net present value of $700,000. That figure includes expected 
future revenue and expenses, including the expected cost of land 
purchases. The planned development will add several hundred jobs 
to the local economy and increase the surrounding property values. 
The developer purchases the first fifty parcels near their $10,000 
market value without much difficulty. However, as other owners 
learn of the developer’s plans, the developer notices it must offer 
higher prices to convince each additional buyer to sell. Instead of 
$10,000, the developer pays $20,000 for the next twenty-five 
properties, $250,000 more than it anticipated. The next fifteen 
properties cost $25,000, an additional $225,000 in unexpected 
costs. The last ten property owners demand $35,000, bringing the 
total unexpected cost of the project to $725,000, and rendering 
what was once a profitable endeavor a net loss. Accordingly, the 
developer declines to purchase the final ten properties and scraps its 
plans for the immediate future. 
Many of the owners in the example may have demanded prices 
above market value because the higher price reflected a subjective 
premium—reasons that the owner had not already sold for market 
 
 68. See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and 
Takings, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 160, 160 (2007). 
 69. The two most common formal definitions of efficiency are Pareto efficiency and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A transaction is Pareto efficient if the welfare of some improves 
without the welfare of anyone else declining. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is less exacting—if a 
transaction produces a welfare surplus to some of sufficient magnitude to exceed the losses 
suffered by others, the test is satisfied, and the transaction is “efficient.” See Richard A. 
Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN 
STATE 42, 51–52 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992). 
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value, like sentimental attachment, relocation costs, or the land’s 
unique suitability to her needs.70 However, it is also quite possible 
that a substantial portion of the last fifty sellers were willing to move 
at $10,000 or $12,000, but they demanded higher prices because 
they knew the developer could not proceed without each parcel in 
the neighborhood; they were “holding out” for the developer’s 
highest offer. The result is that ten property owners prevent a 
Pareto-efficient71 transaction—property owners would have received 
a payment high enough to make them better off after selling their 
properties, and the surrounding community would have enjoyed 
higher property values and increased employment. To correct this 
market inefficiency, many economists argue that state and municipal 
governments should step in and wield their condemnation authority 
to force the holdouts to move.72 
2. Eminent domain is the only viable solution to urban sprawl 
In addition to correcting market inefficiencies, those who 
support broad use of eminent domain point out the practical 
difficulties of urban planning, particularly the problem of avoiding 
urban sprawl and its associated costs.73 Urban sprawl results as 
people migrate to lower-density housing further away from the city’s 
core. Traffic congestion, increased infrastructure costs, and pollution 
soon follow.74 One scholar notes that the average daily commute in 
Atlanta is 36.5 miles, and Washington, D.C. residents waste seventy-
six hours per year sitting in traffic at a cost of $1260 per person.75 
Nationwide, one researcher estimated that lost time and fuel 
resulting from urban sprawl costs $72 billion per year.76 
In order to avoid urban sprawl, city planners argue that they 
need the ability to revitalize stagnant urban areas through eminent 
 
 70. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An 
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 538 
(2006). 
 71. See supra note 69. 
 72. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Eminent Domain Versus Government Purchases of Land 
Given Imperfect Information About Owner’s Valuations, 53 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (2010). 
 73. See Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873 (2000). 
 74. Id. at 875–76. 
 75. Id. at 875. 
 76. Id. 
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domain—such efforts stimulate employment, educational 
opportunities, and provide other public services that attract middle-
class residents that would have otherwise moved to the suburbs.77 
One prominent example of what urban planners want to avoid 
through such measures are cities along America’s rust belt, like 
Detroit, Michigan. The Motor City has hemorrhaged residents since 
the 1950s, falling from a population high of almost 2 million to just 
714,000 in 2010.78 Detroit has 60,000 empty houses that attract 
crime, and plunging property values depress municipal tax revenue 
that funds the city’s schools.79 Contrast that description with 
Pittsburgh, a city that has faced similar economic hardship. In the 
last decade, it seized 1,000 acres of blighted industrial land, 
transforming it into thriving commercial space, which resulted in 
$4.8 billion in economic development.80 Urban planners point to 
Pittsburgh as an eminent domain success story—a city that 
developed a thriving health and technology sector to replace a dying 
manufacturing industry and thereby avoided the fate of cities like 
Detroit.81 
3. Allowing economic-development takings actually protects private 
property 
While most justifications for allowing economic-development 
takings focus on efficiency and rational organization, other scholars 
have argued that restricting the scope of condemnation authority 
would ironically provide fewer protections for property owners.82 
What the government is not allowed to do with eminent domain, it 
can accomplish through zoning, taxation, or legislation redefining 
 
 77. Edward Imperatore, Discriminatory Condemnations and the Fair Housing Act, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1027, 1034–35 (2008). 
 78. The Parable of Detroit: So Cheap, There’s Hope, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22–28, 2011, at 
31. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Other Shrinking Cities: Smaller is More Beautiful, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22–28, 2011, 
at 32, 34. 
 81. Id. Of course, it is worth noting that Detroit’s now infamous use of eminent 
domain to foster economic development produced fewer jobs than headlines. See Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981); Cohen, supra note 
70, at 545 (noting that Detroit’s efforts to condemn property for General Motors displaced 
4,000 residents, destroyed 1,400 homes, between 140 and 600 businesses, and resulted in 
creating just 2,500 jobs, nearly 4,000 fewer than promised). 
 82. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67. 
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property rights, none of which provide compensation to aggrieved 
property owners.83 Thus, all else being equal, property owners would 
prefer suffering deprivation through a taking instead of taxation or 
burdensome zoning regulations.84 Property rights advocates should, 
these scholars argue, push for an expansive reading of public use that 
encompasses as much government activity as possible, not limits to 
condemnation authority. 
B. The Case Against Economic-Development Takings 
For a variety of reasons, scholars from across the ideological 
spectrum oppose the use of eminent domain for economic 
development. Some libertarians concede the theoretical justification 
for such takings, but they argue that practical political realities create 
perverse incentives that offset any efficiency gains that may result 
from a taking.85 Liberals, on the other hand, object to the 
disproportionate impact economic-development takings have on 
minorities and the poor.86 
1. There is no guarantee that economic-development takings actually 
lead to economically efficient outcomes 
As noted above, one of the principal justifications for allowing 
takings for economic development is to alleviate market inefficiencies 
produced by the holdout problem.87 Libertarians point out that 
 
 83. Id. at 1426–33. It is worth noting that this argument overlooks the potential that 
abusive regulations of the sort that the authors describe would constitute regulatory takings. 
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (“[T]he Fifth 
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 84. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 67, at 1426. 
 85. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A 
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2006);
Carrie B. Kerekes, Government Takings: Determinants of Eminent Domain, 13 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 201 (2011). 
 86. See, e.g., Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. 
ECON. 473, 495 (1976) (concluding that owners of less valuable properties are systematically 
undercompensated compared to higher value property owners); Wendell E. Pritchett, The 
“Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 32–35 (2003) (noting that urban redevelopment projects have historically 
affected ethnic minorities disproportionately). 
 87. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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political realities surrounding actual takings produce perverse 
incentives that lead governments and developers to approve 
inefficient projects. They also argue that developers have other tools 
to overcome the holdout problem effectively without resorting to 
eminent domain. 
Neither the developer nor the government has any way of 
knowing whether a recalcitrant property owner is a holdout or 
simply unwilling to part with his property at fair market value. If the 
owner values the property at a price higher than the condemning 
authority is willing to pay, a forced transfer is inefficient88 and socially 
undesirable,89 but it also produces a windfall for the organization 
effectuating the taking.90 Consequently, even in the absence of a 
holdout problem, developers and municipalities will always prefer 
forced condemnations to voluntary purchases. Furthermore, there 
are reasons to believe that under-compensation of the sort described 
here is the norm, not the exception.91 To make matters worse, the 
parties that typically benefit the most from a taking are not required 
to reimburse the state for the cost of condemnation. In effect, 
economic-development takings allow developers to acquire land for 
free, leading them to lobby for more condemnations than the benefit 
of redevelopment would justify.92 
 
 88. Notice that such a transfer is not Pareto efficient, and it may not satisfy the Kaldor-
Hicks test either. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. That is, the government is better 
off having acquired the property for a development project, but the owner is unambiguously 
worse off after receiving compensation lower than he valued his property. The transfer will 
satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks test only if the benefits resulting from the project outweigh the harm 
to owners resulting from under-compensation. 
 89. See Kelly, supra note 85, at 6–7. 
 90. The windfall is equal to the difference between the price the owner would have 
demanded absent the taking and the price paid as just compensation. 
 91. See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“Compensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full compensation, for market 
value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the 
value that the marginal owner attaches to his property. Many owners are ‘intramarginal,’ 
meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of 
the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at 
more than its market value (i.e., it is not ‘for sale’).”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected 
Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 107–08 (2006) (explaining 
that possession itself naturally increases an owner’s valuation of her own property beyond what 
an outsider would attach to it); Kelly, supra note 85, at 6–7 (noting that market value cannot 
measure an owner’s subjective valuation of his property). 
 92. Kelly, supra note 85, at 7–8. 
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There is some anecdotal evidence to support this proposition. 
The redevelopment project in Kelo has resulted in no actual 
development on what are now vacant lots previously owned by the 
petitioners.93 Additionally, the party that stood to benefit the most 
from the condemnation, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, closed its New 
London research development headquarters in 2009.94 Detroit’s 
failure to kick-start its local economy through condemning 
thousands of homes on behalf of General Motors is also well 
chronicled.95 
In addition to failing to produce tangible public benefits, some 
scholars argue that eminent domain is not even necessary to 
overcome the holdout problem in the first place.96 From an 
efficiency standpoint, transfers should only occur if the developer’s 
offer price exceeds the owner’s valuation of the property.97 Recall 
that “holdouts” are not problematic because they refuse to sell; they 
are problematic because they refuse to sell even when a developer 
offers a price higher than the holdouts’ valuation of the property.98 
Because the holdout problem arises when owners become aware that 
their parcels are indispensable to large development projects, 
developers can effectively eliminate the holdout problem through 
use of secret land purchasing agents. Existing owners never realize 
the agents are assembling parcels for a large project, and in many 
cases, neither do the agents themselves.99 As a result, no purchaser 
has an incentive to artificially inflate her price, the developer fully 
compensates each owner, and the project only goes forward if the 
expected profits from the investment justify the expense of the 
project—a Pareto-efficient outcome. If a developer is unable to offer 
each individual owner a satisfactory price through secret land 
purchases, that means each refusing landowner’s true valuation of 
her property exceeded the developer’s willingness to pay. 
 
 93. Epstein, supra note 65, at 165–66. 
 94. Editorial, Pfizer and Kelo’s Ghost Town, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A20. 
 95. See Cohen, supra note 70, at 545. 
 96. Kelly, supra note 85, at 20–22; Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: 
Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 S. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 203–10 (2007). 
 97. Kelly, supra note 85, at 19. 
 98. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
 99. Kelly, supra note 85, at 21 n.110 (explaining Disney’s double-blind purchasing 
agent system, where neither the property owners nor the purchasing agents were aware that 
properties were being assembled for a larger project). 
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Consequently, forcing them to move at any price would not be a 
Pareto-efficient outcome. Of course, depending on the value of the 
project, such an outcome may not satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks test.   
2. The disparate impact of economic-development takings on minorities 
and the poor 
Not only is there evidence that economic-development takings 
produce rather-than-correct market inefficiencies, but many 
commentators also point out that such takings disproportionately 
target poor minority communities.100 For instance, one of the 
country’s first large urban redevelopment projects in New York City 
uprooted 11,000 working-class families, replacing them with 8756 
middle-class families.101 Several years later, ten of the eleven 
neighborhoods singled out by Los Angeles for condemnation and 
redevelopment had majority Hispanic or black populations.102 
Similarly, Chicago’s efforts to redevelop its south side almost 
completely overlaid the area’s predominantly black 
neighborhoods.103 
To make matters worse, the populations most likely to be subject 
to development condemnations are also those most likely to lack the 
resources necessary to launch legal challenges to protect their 
rights.104 An owner who wants to keep her property might seek an 
injunction to prevent the taking, but even a successful action would 
not generate money damages to attract attorneys to take the case on 
a contingent-fee basis.105 
IV. INADEQUACY OF PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Proposals to curb the use of eminent domain in the wake of Kelo 
are too voluminous to treat exhaustively. However, the most 
practically relevant proposals are recently enacted state legislation, 
 
 100. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 55–56 (1993); Imperatore, supra note 
77, at 1033–34;Munch, supra note 86, at 495 (finding that owners of less valuable properties 
are systematically undercompensated); Pritchett, supra note 86, at 32–35.  
 101. Pritchett, supra note 86, at 33. 
 102. Id. at 33–34. 
 103. Id. at 34–35. 
 104. Imperatore, supra note 77, at 1034. 
 105. Id. 
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which purport to limit condemnation authority for economic 
development, and H.R. 1433, which is now in its third iteration and 
currently stalled in the House of Representatives.106 This Part first 
presents the results of an exhaustive survey of all fifty states’ 
eminent-domain regimes. It then examines the weaknesses in federal-
reform efforts. Despite the flood of post-Kelo reforms from state 
legislatures across the country, more than two-thirds of the resulting 
legislation is largely cosmetic. Additionally, despite bipartisan support 
for eminent-domain reform on the federal level, Congress has been 
unable to pass H.R. 1433 in its last three sessions, and the bill’s 
substantive protections are fairly modest. 
A. State Constitutional Amendments and Statutory Bans: Too Far or 
Not Far Enough? 
State reform efforts have generally targeted three types of 
eminent domain abuse: (1) expansive public-use definitions that 
include enhanced tax revenue or employment opportunities to the 
general public, which allows condemned property to be transferred 
to private developers; (2) vague definitions of blight that enable 
municipalities to condemn virtually any type of property and convey 
it to private developers; and (3) urban redevelopment statutes that 
allow municipalities to condemn entire neighborhoods in which a 
sufficient proportion of parcels meet the state’s blight definition. 
Without substantive protection in each of these categories, reforms 
in the other two are largely ineffectual. For instance, many states 
prohibit any condemnation that results in a transfer from one private 
entity to another, yet provide an exception for takings that eliminate 
blight.107 If a vague blight definition covers most residential 
property,108 any protection against condemnations for private 
development is largely hollow. Similarly, even a narrow blight 
definition coupled with a ban on economic-development takings fails 
to protect all property owners if a municipality can condemn non-
 
 106. See infra note 131. 
 107. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 523.271, 523.274, 99.805 (2012).  
 108. Many states’ blight definitions are so vague that most property satisfies their criteria. 
Courts have concluded that Times Square and downtown Las Vegas were ‘blighted,” justifying 
condemnations to make way for the New York Times’s new headquarters in Manhattan and 
several new casinos on the strip. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 
P.3d 1, 12–15 (Nev. 2003); W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 
121, 125–26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002), cited in  Somin, supra note 4, at 2121. 
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blighted property located in an area predominated by blighted 
conditions.109 
Unfortunately, few state reform packages provide comprehensive 
protection. Table 1 summarizes the results of an exhaustive survey of 
eminent domain reform efforts across the country. Of the forty-four 
states that have passed eminent domain reform in response to Kelo, 
only thirteen provide substantive protection against each of the 
potential abuses mentioned above;110 nineteen states do not provide 
meaningful limits on economic-development takings, thirty-six states 
have blight exceptions with vague definitions of blight, and thirty-
one allow non-blighted property to be condemned and conveyed to 




Table 1—Summary of post-Kelo eminent-domain legislation  
Number of states that have passed reform 44
Number of states that do not meaningfully 
limit economic-development takings
19
Number of states with a blight exception
and vague blight definitions
36
Number of states that allow non-blighted 
property to be taken in a blighted area
23
Number of states with substantive 
provisions in each category
13
1. States that failed to meaningfully limit economic-development 
takings 
Many states have passed measures that purport to limit authority 
to condemn private property for economic development, but the 
statutory language employed provides condemning authorities with 
plenty of wiggle room to seize property and convey it to private 
developers. In Wisconsin and Oregon, property cannot be 
 
 109. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34–36 (1954) (holding that a non-blighted 
department store could be condemned as part of a city’s plan to redevelop a blighted 
neighborhood). 
 110. See Appendix A for a summary of reform efforts in all fifty states. 
 111. Id. 
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condemned if the government “intends” to convey or lease the 
property to a private entity at the time of the condemnation.112 
Despite the ostensible protections against private-to-private takings 
the language provides, it is not difficult to imagine problematic 
scenarios. A municipality may seize land for a public project but later 
find that it does not have adequate funding. A subsequent 
conveyance to a private entity for development would be exactly the 
type of taking at issue in Kelo, but the problematic “intent” language 
would not prohibit it. Similarly, statutes in Missouri, Nebraska, and 
Ohio only prohibit takings that are “primarily” or “solely” for the 
purpose of economic development.113 Creative city councils could 
easily skirt these statutory protections by asserting that a private-to-
private taking enhances public health, safety, or any other purpose 
related to a traditional state-police power. Finally, Indiana, Kansas, 
and Louisiana enacted statutes that ban takings whose primary 
purpose is to enhance tax revenue or employment, but they provide 
exceptions for “certified technology parks,” legislative 
authorizations, and “industrial plant sites,” respectively.114 
2. States that employ over- or under-inclusive definitions of blight 
While a substantial number of states have managed to pass 
legislation that meaningfully limits economic-development takings, 
many of them provide exceptions for blight removal, and many of 
them define blight in a way that could apply to almost any property 
within its borders. For example, North Carolina bans the use of 
eminent domain against parcels that are not blighted,115 but it 
defines blight as the presence of any one of several vague factors such 
as “dilapidation,” “age,” or “obsolescence” that “impairs the sound 
growth of the community, is conducive to ill health ” or “is 
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare . . . .”116 
New Hampshire’s blight definition is probably worse, including such 
factors as “dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty 
 
 112. See OR. REV. STAT. § 35.015 (2010); WIS. STAT. § 32.03 (2011).  
 113. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 523.271, 523.274, 99.805 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-
710.04, 18-2103(11) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 163.01, 1.08 (West 2007). 
 114. IND. CODE §§ 32-24-4.5-1, 32-24-4.5-7 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-501a, 
26-501b (2006); LA. CONST. art. I, § 4, art. VI, § 21.  
 115. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-515, -512(6) (2012). 
 116. Id. § 160A-503(2).  
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arrangement or design,” “excessive land coverage,” “deleterious land 
use or obsolete layout,” or any other factors that are “detrimental to 
the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.”117 Such an 
expansive blight definition eviscerates otherwise strong state 
constitutional protections that prohibit takings that transfer property 
directly or indirectly to an entity for private development or private 
use.118 
Other states have either established narrow statutory definitions 
of blight or prohibit the use of condemnation authority for blight 
removal altogether. Arizona requires that any blighted condition 
constitute “a direct threat to public health or safety,” while Georgia 
requires the presence of at least two of six factors, the majority of 
which involve affirmative harm to the public.119 Florida and New 
Mexico are two of four states that do not allow municipalities to 
eliminate blight through eminent domain.120 New Mexico provides 
municipalities with “all the powers, other than the power of eminent 
domain, necessary or convenient” to carry out redevelopment 
projects,121 and Florida does not allow condemning property for the 
purpose of eliminating blight.122 While property rights activists have 
lauded efforts in both states as a model for the rest of the country,123 
these measures will diminish municipalities’ ability to deal with actual 
blight and urban sprawl,124 or may paradoxically prompt city councils 
to adopt vague nuisance ordinances to deal with problems they 
 
 117. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 205:2, 205:3–a (2012). 
 118. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 12-a.  
 119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1136(5)(iii) (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1 (2006)  
(defining blight as the presence of any two of the following conditions: (i) uninhabitable, 
unsafe, or abandoned structures; (ii) inadequate provisions for ventilation, light, air, or 
sanitation; (iii) an imminent harm to life or other property caused by a natural disaster; (iv) a 
site identified by the Environmental Protection Agency as a Superfund site; (v) repeated illegal 
activity on the individual property of which the owner knew or should have known; or (vi) 
maintenance of property violates municipal building codes for at least one year after notice of 
the violation). 
 120. The other two are North Dakota and South Dakota. See N.D. CONST. art. I, sec. 
16; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–15–01 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 11–7–22.1, 11–7–22.2 
(2006).  
 121. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-60A-10 (2007). 
 122. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.013 to .014 (2006).  
 123. See Legislative Center, CASTLE COALITION, 
www.castlecoalition.org/legislativecenter (grading both states’ reform efforts as some of the 
most effective in the country) (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
 124. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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previously remedied with compensated takings.125 Utah’s state 
legislature may have experienced such problems first hand, as it 
reversed a prohibition on blight condemnations just two years after 
its initial enactment.126 
3. States that allow blight takings of non-blighted property 
Several states that provide otherwise exemplary protections 
against private-to-private takings in addition to narrow blight 
exceptions also allow municipalities to take non-blighted property 
located in blighted areas. Nevada’s state constitution prohibits the 
direct or indirect transfer of any interest in property taken in an 
eminent domain proceeding to another private party, and its blight 
definition requires an immediate threat to public safety.127 However, 
the state allows condemning authorities to acquire non-blighted 
properties through eminent domain if the property is located in an 
area in which at least two-thirds of the surrounding parcels are 
blighted.128 Similarly, West Virginia, whose blight definition is 
somewhat less inclusive than Nevada’s, allows the government to 
take non-blighted property if it can show that there are no available 
alternative sites in the blighted area and it has taken every reasonable 
effort to avoid resorting to eminent domain.129 Even Utah, which 
has a fairly narrow public-use definition, allows private owner-
occupied homes to be condemned if eighty percent of the property 
owners in the area voice their approval.130 Thus, even in states that 
appear to provide some of the strongest private property protections 
in the country, a model property owner could still face 
condemnation if enough of her neighbors allow their property to 
deteriorate, or, at least in Utah, prefer she move elsewhere. 
 
 125. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 126. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-501, 17C-2-601 (LexisNexis 2012); Legislative 
Center: Utah, CASTLE COALITION, www.castlecoalition.org/about/1373 (last visited Jan. 2, 
2012). 
 127. NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22; NEV. REV. STAT. § 37.010 (2011). 
 128. NEV. REV. STAT. § 279.471 (2011). 
 129. W. VA. CODE §16-18-6a (2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 54-1-2, 16-18-3 (2006). 
 130. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17C-2-601, 78B-6-501 (LexisNexis 2012). 
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B. The Feds Fall Short: The Private Property Rights Protection Act 
(H.R. 1433) 
At least with respect to potential impact and precise statutory 
drafting, federal efforts to eliminate economic-development takings 
show more promise than the state legislation described above; that 
is, if Congress ever decides to pass them. Despite bipartisan support 
from co-sponsors as ideologically diverse as Rep. Maxine Waters (D-
CA) on the left and Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) on the right, H.R. 
1433, Congress’s latest effort at eminent domain reform, has stalled 
in the House Judiciary Committee.131 Previous efforts as early as 
2005 have met similar fates.132 
Setting politics aside, H.R. 1433 largely avoids many of the 
pitfalls that plague state legislation. The bill prohibits federal and 
state authorities from using eminent domain authority for economic 
development and authorizes property owners to file suit against state 
agencies in the event of such a taking.133 Its definition of economic-
development takings avoids the problematic ‘intent’ and ‘purpose’ 
language that plagues some state statutes, focusing instead on 
takings that result in the conveyance or lease of property from “one 
private person or entity to another . . . for commercial enterprise . . . 
or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general 
economic health.”134 The bill includes exceptions for traditional 
public works projects135 and blight, but H.R. 1433’s blight exception 
requires “harmful uses of land [that] . . . constitute an immediate 
threat to public health and safety.”136 Thus, the bill provides 
meaningful limits on economic-development takings, has a narrow 
definition of blight, and does not allow the taking of non-blighted 
properties near blighted areas—so far so good. 
Unfortunately, H.R. 1433 does not have any real teeth, and its 
enforcement mechanisms are probably inadequate. States that violate 
 
 131. Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. (2011), THOMAS.LOC.GOV, 
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR01433:@@@X (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
 132. See supra note 67. 
 133. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. §§ 2–4 
(2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.1433:.  
 134. Id. § 9(1). 
 135. Id. § 9(1)(A) (allowing exceptions for public ownership, hospitals, roads, airports, 
common carriers, flood control, abandoned property, and other non-private uses). 
 136. Id. § 9(1)(B). 
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its provisions lose “federal economic-development funds” for up to 
two years.137 While it is not clear which federal grants would be 
included in that definition, one scholar has estimated that the total 
amount of money at stake nation-wide is just $7.4 billion, or 1.8% of 
all federal grants to states and municipalities in 2005.138 Additionally, 
because the bill allows states to restore their funding by returning 
“all real property[,] the taking of which was found by a court of 
competent jurisdiction to have constituted a violation” of H.R. 
1433,139 states can easily avoid sanctions for any takings for which 
the owner did not file suit under federal law, and the bill’s 
enforcement provisions certainly do not encourage lawsuits. That is, 
although H.R. 1433 purports to create a private cause of action, its 
language seems to authorize injunctive relief, not money damages.140 
Consequently, because the victims of eminent domain abuse typically 
cannot afford to hire an attorney,141 many potential plaintiffs are 
unlikely to obtain counsel that would otherwise be available for a 
contingent fee. 
Perhaps not wholly unaware of these problems, H.R. 1433’s 
drafters included provisions that allow the attorney general to receive 
reports from aggrieved property owners and file lawsuits against state 
agencies on their behalf.142 While certainly an improvement, federal 
law enforcement agencies are already overburdened, especially 
considering rising threats posed by international terrorism and cyber-
crime.143 If large-scale financial fraud is currently at the bottom of 
federal investigative priorities lists,144 it is not hard to predict where a 
$200,000 residential property taking would end up. 
V. CONCLUSION: PROPOSING A PRACTICAL, POLITICALLY VIABLE 
NATIONAL SOLUTION 
This Comment has pointed out a number of issues that need to 
be addressed in any effective eminent domain reform effort. First, a 
 
 137. Id. §§ 2(b), 9(2). 
 138. Somin, supra note 4, at 2150–51. 
 139. H.R. 1433 § 2(c). 
 140. Id. § 4(a). 
 141. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 142. H.R. 1433 § 5. 
 143. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF FBI PERSONNEL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT AND CASEWORK 8–14, 17–21 (April 2010). 
 144. Id. at 8, 28–29. 
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century of Supreme Court public-use jurisprudence has clearly 
established an expansive reading of the Fifth Amendment, making 
the prospect of substantive change through the courts dubious at 
best;145 legislative efforts are thus the preferred course. Second, 
under most state eminent domain regimes, private developers have 
no skin in the game; they acquire costless land through 
condemnation, leading them to lobby for excessive takings.146 Third, 
there are compelling reasons why an absolute ban on takings for 
economic development, including blight removal, would be 
misguided.147 Fourth, piecemeal reform efforts at the state level have 
led to comprehensive protections in just thirteen states, no 
protection in six states, and overprotection in four states,148 making 
federal legislation the most promising avenue for effective reform. 
Fifth, optimal eminent domain reform probably includes a ban on 
economic-development takings, a narrowly defined blight exception, 
and protections that prohibit non-blighted properties near blighted 
areas from being condemned. Sixth, federal legislation must impose 
meaningful penalties for violations and provide money damages to 
promote adequate enforcement. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, any proposed legislation must generate enough 
bipartisan support to actually become law. This Part puts forward a 
tentative proposal that addresses each of these issues, modeled 
loosely on shareholder derivative suits. 
Generally, shareholder derivative suits allow a company 
shareholder to sue an executive on behalf of the corporation. In 
most cases, the plaintiff does not receive any damages, which are 
instead remitted to the company. Before the suit can go forward, the 
shareholder must ask the company to take action; if it refuses, the 
litigant can proceed with her suit.149 Several aspects of this 
framework, coupled with an effective definition of blight and public 
 
 145. See supra Part II. It is also worth noting that the Court has applied rational-basis 
review to economic legislation for almost a century, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 
(1934), and economic-development takings naturally fall in that category. Persuading even the 
Court’s most conservative members to overturn such an entrenched fixture of constitutional 
law is unlikely. 
 146. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 147. See supra Part III.A. 
 148. See supra Part IV.A. 
 149. See generally DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS LAW 
AND PRACTICE (2011). 
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use, provide a useful starting point for a practical, politically viable 
solution to the economic takings problem that addresses each of the 
issues identified above. 
To begin with, takings that result in the transfer of property from 
one private entity to another should be prohibited. To that end, the 
statute’s public-use definition should largely conform to H.R. 1433’s 
language outlining permissible takings.150 The statute should also 
include a narrowly defined blight exception, allowing condemned 
property to be transferred to private developers only if the parcel’s 
current use constitutes an immediate threat to public health and 
safety. Condemnation of non-blighted property should be 
prohibited, and no public entity should be allowed to condemn non-
blighted property because of its proximity to blighted parcels. 
Additionally, the statute should require developers and 
municipalities in every condemnation proceeding to file a pre-
condemnation report in the state’s real property recording system 
that details the purpose of the taking, the expected qualitative 
benefits, and the estimated monetary value of redevelopment. The 
private developer would be required to pledge collateral to cover at 
least half the monetary value stated in the pre-condemnation report. 
Any person listed in the recording system as an owner of a fee simple 
estate or other interest in the condemnation area would have a 
private cause of action if the taking was either not for public use as 
provided in the statute, or the benefits of the development failed to 
accrue within a reasonable time after the condemnation. A successful 
litigant would be entitled to her pro rata share151 of the monetary 
value stated in the pre-condemnation report, and each owner of an 
interest in the condemned area would automatically receive her own 
pro rata share of the funds upon the conclusion of a successful 
lawsuit regardless of whether the owner was party to the suit. Courts 
would be free to impose punitive damages on parties that 
 
 150. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2012, H.R. 1433, 112th Cong. § 9(1)(A) 
(2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.1433: (allowing 
takings for public ownership, availability to the general public, public transportation, public 
infrastructure, incidental private use in a publicly owned building, acquiring abandoned 
property, public utilities, and clearing defective titles). 
 151. To calculate each owner’s pro rata share, the value of each parcel in the condemned 
area would be added up, and the value of each owner’s interest would be divided by the total 
value, yielding a percentage of the total value. For instance, if an owner’s condemned property 
was worth $100,000 in a condemned area with a total value of $1,000,000, she would be 
entitled to ten percent of the monetary value listed in the pre-condemnation report. 
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intentionally understate the benefits of a redevelopment project in 
the pre-condemnation report. Procedurally, an aggrieved property 
owner would first be required to approach the condemning 
authority, state the basis of her claim, and request that the public and 
private entity involved in the condemnation pay each owner his or 
her pro rata share. If the condemning authority and the developer 
refuse, a suit can commence. Plaintiffs’ attorneys would collect a 
contingent fee based on the total recovery, not their client’s pro rata 
share. 
These provisions are important for several reasons. First, private 
developers are forced to internalize the cost of condemnations when 
making investment decisions, without letting state agencies off the 
hook. Second, condemning authorities no longer have an incentive 
to overstate the public benefits associated with a redevelopment 
project; these authorities will be liable for at least fifty cents of every 
dollar they overstate, and understating benefits risks the imposition 
of punitive damages. Third, providing money damages, automatic 
remittance of pro rata shares to property owners not party to the 
lawsuit, and attorney fees proportional to the entire award provides 
incentives for vigorous enforcement without burdening federal or 
state law enforcement agencies, and takes into account the relative 
poverty of those most often affected by condemnations. Fourth, the 
enforcement mechanism and monetary damages provisions force 
municipalities to carefully screen redevelopment proposals, 
approving only those they feel are both certain to produce their 
predicted benefits and strictly conform to statutory definitions of 
public use. 
Most importantly, these provisions provide something legislators 
from both political parties could sell to their constituents. Liberals 
can claim victory for protecting minorities and the poor from crony 
capitalism, as well as forcing corporations to pay their fair share. 
Conservatives can trumpet comprehensive private property 
protections that forever prohibit the type of takings at issue in Kelo, 
Midkiff, and Berman. Additionally, liberals would certainly feel 
pressure from trial lawyer associations to approve a potential boon to 
the profession. 
In today’s hyper-partisan political environment, it is rare for 
liberal and conservative lawmakers to share such broad agreement on 
much of anything, let alone on a politicized issue like eminent 
domain reform. It would be a shame for legislators from both sides 
of the aisle to miss a historic opportunity to provide meaningful and 
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equal Fifth Amendment protections for property owners across the 
country. The Supreme Court’s early takings jurisprudence 
unwittingly opened a veritable Pandora’s box of bad policy for which 
a judicial remedy has proven elusive. Property rights advocates can 
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